those who purvey and consume these knowledges, wittingly or not. They are productive as well as produced.
The second thing to say is equally obvious: that universities are merely one site where geographical knowledges are produced and from which they circulate into the wider society. Universities and their disciplinary constituents may once have held a nearmonopoly on the production of formalised, non-colloquial knowledge. These days, however, they exist in societies (at least here in the West) where the volume and diversity of knowledge has expanded in proportion to the number of institutions and actors in the knowledge-producing business -for instance, the media, think tanks, research institutes, NGOs, charities and religious bodies like the Scientologists. As David Harvey memorably insisted in 1974, we should ask of these knowledges not whether they are For instance, Paul Trowler's (1998) book Academics responding to change -which is about UK higher education -identifies an 'implementation gap' that has frustrated the attempts of ministers, civil servants and university managers to corporatise British universities. This is not, of course, to say that nothing has changed; clearly, much has altered in British universities, as it has in virtually all other Western tertiary sectors. But I suspect we're in the middle of a 'long revolution': there is still time to use our remaining status and freedom as public professionals to offer a vision of university education that does not accommodate instrumentalism to the exclusion of everything else in the production, teaching and use of geographical knowledge. (Castree, 2002) . As I will explain below, I think senior geographers and established academics more generally have a special role to play here. My penultimate point is that all this relates to that fabulously rich and polysemic term whose meaning is always worth struggling over: namely, value. I'd be prepared to say that academic freedom is an absolute good -a value in itself. Why? Because it prevents one or other kind of knowledge being seen as especially valuable over and above any other kinds.
In other words, academic freedom is the value that allows other values to find a home.
As the philosopher Gordon Graham (2002) argues in his little book Universities, if all academic knowledge is made to serve one or other social need -like graduate employability -then we lose one important source of ideas for engendering economic, cultural and moral change in society.
My final comment relates to practical actions to uphold academic freedom within and beyond the discipline of geography. Ultimately, the national state remains the best guarantor of academic freedom to the extent that it upholds the idea that universities have the right to be self-governing. This idea is, of course, under attack here in Britain, albeit in the cunning guise of us all disciplining ourselves to conform to the contentless culture of RAE, national teaching assessment etc. In departments like my own we are all, in some senses, acting in loco politicus for external initiatives designed to make British universities more responsive to economic needs. Two ways to reverse this trend strike me as quite important. First, and most obviously, I think senior figures in geography and other disciplines have a special responsibility to articulate a vision of what universities' function should properly be. I'm not suggesting that they originate such a vision: that is and should be a collective endeavour. But I am suggesting that these figures have a privileged role in upholding (or not) an idea of what universities are for that can serve the interests of the diverse constituency of researchers and teachers that comprise geography and myriad other disciplines. The difficulty, of course, is that professional success often means that one accepts the blandishments of the prevailing regime. It takes courage to draw a line in the sand if you and those whose interests you notionally represent think it necessary to do so. Secondly, and less obviously, I think the rest of us need to recognise how important it is to undertaken the endless, mundane work of speaking against the drip-drip of outside initiatives that erode academic freedom. Such speaking against can take the form of objections raised in faculty meetings, criticisms made in formal invited responses to HEFCE position papers, and so on. As Christopher Hitchens (2001: 3) notes, "most people, most of the time, prefer to seek approval or security", and he reminds us that "doing nothing is also a decision" (ibid. 83). I think that if we wish to
